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Evidence-based	policy	as	reflexive	practice.	What	can	we	learn	from	
evidence-based	medicine?		Roland	Bal,	Erasmus	University	Rotterdam				
Summary	The	call	for	evidence-based	policy	(EBP)	is	often	accompanied	by	rather	uncritical	references	to	the	success	of	evidence-based	medicine	(EBM),	leading	to	often-unsuccessful	translation	attempts.	In	this	paper,	I	reflect	on	the	practice	of	EBM	in	an	attempt	to	sketch	a	more	productive	approach.	Discussing	three	‘moments’	of	EBM—clinical	trials,	the	production	and	use	of	clinical	guidelines—I	conclude	that	the	success	of	EBM	is	based	on	the	creation	of	reflexive	practices	in	which	evidence	and	practice	can	be	combined	productively.	In	the	conclusion	I	discuss	the	prospects	of	such	a	practice	for	evidence-based	policy.			Keywords:	evidence-based	policy,	evidence-based	medicine,	reflexivity			
Introduction	During	one	of	the	first	weeks	at	my	then	new	workplace,	the	Department	of	Health	Policy	and	Management	in	Rotterdam,	the	then	Minister	of	Health	decided	to	exclude	Viagra	from	the	basic	reimbursement	package.	The	economists	at	the	Department,	who	had	just	concluded	from	their	research	that	Viagra	was	a	very	cost-effective	drug,	were	shocked.	How	could	the	Minister	keep	a	cost-effective	drug	away	from	patients,	while	at	the	same	time	leaving	some	of	the	most	cost-ineffective	therapies	such	as	lung	transplants	open	for	reimbursement	(1)?	I,	as	a	relative	newcomer	to	the	field	of	healthcare	but	experienced	in	studying	science	advice,	was,	in	turn,	shocked	by	the	naivety	of	my	colleagues.	How	could	the	Minister	be	expected	to	reimburse	a	medication	that	might	be	used	for	a	medical	condition	but	is	mostly	considered	to	be	a	lifestyle	drug?	And	yet,	the	phenomenon	of	politicians	not	eager	to	follow	research	results	is	no	longer	strange	to	me	either.	Let	me	give	you	two	examples	from	my	own	research.		Recently,	Dutch	healthcare	policy	has	placed	an	increasing	pressure	on	the	concentration	of	hospital	care	fuelled	by	the	assumption	that	doing	more	of	the	same	diagnostic	and	therapeutic	processes	improves	the	quality	of	care.	The	Ministry	of	Health	and	health	insurers	especially	have	stimulated	hospitals	and	medical	specialists	to	concentrate	all	kinds	of	care	processes—complex	oncology,	emergency	departments,	intensive	care,	stroke	services.	I	have	been	involved	in	different	projects	evaluating	such	concentrations.	These	evaluations	have	illustrated	that	the	evidence	for	the	relation	between	volume	and	quality	is	restricted	to	just	a	few	care	processes,	mainly	involving	highly	complex	care,	but	that	even	for	those	causality	is	not	clear.	Activities	of	hospitals	and	medical	specialists	to	concentrate	care	are	mainly	driven	by	organisational	and	financial	motives	(while	the	evidence	in	this	regard	is	also	poor).	Meanwhile,	concentrating	care	also	creates	lots	of	challenges,	mainly	in	the	coordination	of	
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care	for	multi-morbid	patients	and	in	the	levels	of	expertise	in	departments	where	care	is	‘concentrated	away’,	i.e.	neurology	departments	that	loose	their	stroke	specialists	(2,	3).	Within	health	policy,	these	issues	barely	receive	attention	however	and	concentration	policies	are	increasingly	pursued.	Second	example:	in	recent	years	I	have	been	involved	in	research	on	‘transparency’	policies	and	especially	the	quantification	of	the	quality	of	care	through	performance	indicators,	benchmarks	and	rankings	(4,	5).	These	projects	invariably	showed	that	while	there	are	some	positive	effects	of	transparency	policies,	overall	they	have	led	to	lots	of	perverse	effects.	Rather	than	‘representing’	the	level	of	quality	of	care,	quantitative	measures	‘constitute’	such	qualities.	Again,	policy	makers	have	largely	ignored	this	research	and	have	continued	in	their	quest	for	transparency.	The	Dutch	Ministry	of	Health	has	even	called	2015	the	‘year	of	transparency’	without	paying	any	attention	to	demonstrated	negative	effects	of	such	policies	(6).		Now,	I’m	not	so	naive	as	to	think	that	my	research	would	change	policy	and	I	do	not	foster	the	fantasy	that	influencing	policy	through	research	is	a	clear-cut	and	linear	process.	Students	of	the	relation	between	science	and	policy	have	convincingly	shown	the	complexity	of	that	relation	(7-9),	also	indicating	that	this	is	not	a	typical	Dutch	problem.	But	still,	systematically	ignoring	all	unwelcome	research	results	is	yet	another	extreme	A	bit	of	evidence	in	policy	might	not	be	a	bad	thing,	one	would	think.	But	how	do	we	get	it	there?		
The	example	of	Evidence-Based	Medicine	In	health	care,	one	quickly	refers	to	evidence-based	medicine	(EBM)	in	this	situation.	The	EBM	movement,	as	generally	understood,	has	succeeded	in	bringing	about	a	radical	change	in	the	way	medicine	in	taught	and	practiced.	Just	as	with	evidence-based	policy	(EBP),	this	has	brought	both	praise	and	criticism.	Critics	argue	that	EBM	has	lead	to	standardized	care	in	which	the	individual	patient	has	suffered	under	the	violence	of	the	evidence	produced	in	randomized	controlled	trials,	and	in	which	the	autonomy	of	individual	doctors	has	been	denied	(10).	Advocates	of	EBM	on	the	other	hand	have	argued	that	EBM	has	lead	to	reducing	bad	quality	of	care	and	that	standardization	has	strengthened	rather	than	weakened	the	profession.	Both	groups	however	tend	to	plead	from	a	rather	formalistic	version	of	EBM	that	does	little	justice	to	the	ways	in	which	EBM	is	practiced	(11).		A	similar	emphasis	on	the	formalistic,	external	characteristics	of	EBM	can	be	found	in	arguments	to	translate	EBM	to	the	world	of	policy	and	management	(12,	13).	These	authors	thereby	sidestep	the	situated	and	emergent	character	of	EBM	as	described	especially	by	scholars	from	Science	&	Technology	Studies.	Despite	all	claims,	EBM	is	most	certainly	not	a	universalistic	operating	machine	but	is	displaying	much	local	variation	(14).	Moreover,	translating	the	formalistic	character	of	EBM	to	policy	contexts	has	practically	proven	to	be	of	little	use.	Even	Chalmers,	in	the	just	cited	paper,	has	to	admit	that	despite	all	attempts	to	do	just	this,	an	evidence-based	policy	has	not	come	about.	For	example,	the	practice	of	the	Dutch	Centre	for	Healthy	Living	to	create	a	list	of	evidence-based	interventions	has	not	lead	to	interventions	that	can	be	used,	let	alone	be	successful	in	public	health	practices	(15).	Reasons	for	this	are	that	the	
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complexity	and	dynamics	of	policy	contexts	are	usually	not	taken	into	account	in	these	translations	and	that	political	realities	are	ignored.		In	this	essay,	I	want	to	explore	another,	pragmatic,	picture	of	EBM	to	add	to	the	discussion	on	the	(im)possibilities	of	using	EBM	as	an	example	for	evidence-based	policy.	Doing	this,	I	take	an	insiders	perspective—without	trying	to	suggest	that	an	outsiders	critique	of	EBM	or	EBP	would	not	be	interesting	or	valuable—in	which	I	am	especially	interested	in	the	question	how	EBM,	and	in	its	wake	EBP,	can	be	successful.	I	will	do	this	by	analysing	three	‘episodes’	in	the	practice	of	EBM.	Those	three	episodes	can	also	be	seen	as	three	consecutive	phases	in	the	practice	of	EBM:	the	production	of	evidence	through	medical	research	(especially	the	clinical	trial);	the	gathering	of	evidence	in	the	production	of	clinical	guidelines;	and	the	use	of	evidence	in	healthcare	practices	through	the	implementation	of	guidelines.	The	analysis	of	those	episodes	is	based	on	research	I	have	been	involved	in	over	the	past	years.		
The	clinical	trial	as	a	reflexive	space	between	research	and	practice	The	randomized	clinical	trial	(RCT)	is	probably	the	greatest	good	of	the	evidence-based	medicine	movement	and	referred	to	by	Timmermans	and	Berg	as	the	‘gold	standard’	(14).	The	RCT	has	been	developed	during	the	20th	Century	in	reaction	to	the	disadvantages	of	a	medicine	based	on	clinical	practice,	translating	all	kinds	of	methodological	prescriptions	from	the	natural	sciences	to	healthcare,	and	alongside	developing	an	ethics	of	medical	research	(e.g.	the	practice	of	informed	
consent).	Historians	and	sociologists	of	science	have	thoroughly	documented	this	development,	which	I	am	not	going	to	repeat	here	(16,	17).		Like	EBM	in	general,	the	RCT	also	has	its	critics.	And	again,	mainly	the	standardization	central	to	RCT	is	the	main	target.	To	perform	a	clinical	trial,	one	has	to	standardize	the	group	that	is	being	researched,	the	treatment	(or	diagnostic	procedure)	under	investigation	and	the	context	in	which	the	research	is	taking	place.	That	necessity	produces	frictions.	Standardizing	the	group	being	researched	leads	to	the	exclusion	of	all	kinds	of	groups—children,	the	ageing	population,	people	with	multiple	diseases.	Interventions	are	kept	simple,	that	is	‘evaluable’,	because	too	complex	interventions	are	harder	to	research	in	the	RCT	framework.	And	the	dynamics	and	complexity	of	practical	contexts	in	usually	ignored.	RCTs	thus	lead	to	knowledge	production	about	‘ideal’	patients	in	‘ideal’	circumstances	that	usually	has	little	value	for	practice.	In	the	wake	of	the	RCT,	as	a	result	of	these	criticisms,	other	forms	of	experimental	research	have	been	developed,	like	the	‘pragmatic	trial’,	but	these	usually	have	the	same	problems	(18).		Now	the	criticism	on	the	RCT	on	the	one	hand	is	justified	but	is	on	the	other	also	missing	out	on	an	important	point:	the	practice	of	medical	research	is	different	from	what	is	prescribed	in	the	methods	textbooks,	or	described	in	the	methods	sections	of	scientific	papers.	Trials	in	practice	are	much	messier	than	being	pictured	in	the	methods	literature,	if	only	because	of	problems	with	the	inclusion	of	patients,	the	impossibilities	of	completely	standardizing	treatments	or	the	keeping	under	control	of	contexts.	Resultantly,	Ethnographies	of	trials	often	paint	a	different	picture.	
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	An	example	is	research	that	we	did	on	the	‘PreCare’	trial,	a	randomized	trial	that	was	done	in	youth	care,	in	which	an	intervention	that	was	originally	developed	and	tested	in	the	United	States	on	‘problematic	teen	mothers’	was	translated	to	the	Dutch	context	(19).	The	‘intervention’	that	was	researched	in	this	trial	entailed	that	youth	workers	would	pay	a	total	of	18	visits	to	mothers	in	the	research	group	on	the	basis	of	a	standardized	protocol.	In	practice,	this	proved	to	be	near	to	impossible,	due	to	no	show	of	the	mothers,	or	due	to	their	home	situation,	e.g.	the	presence	of	aggressive	fathers,	etc.	Also,	the	home	workers	were	dissatisfied	with	the	trial	because	they	didn’t	want	to	withhold	an	intervention	they	thought	to	be	effective	from	the	control	arm	of	the	trial.		To	deal	with	these	and	similar	problems,	within	the	context	of	the	trial	‘practice	groups’	were	organized,	bringing	together	the	researchers,	the	youth	workers	and	their	managers.	These	groups	mediated	between	the	research	and	practices	and	devised	situated,	practical	solutions	that	would	enable	resolutions	for	the	frictions	found.	Not	all	conflicts	could	be	remedied	through	this	procedure;	the	youth	workers	remained	dissatisfied	with	not	being	able	to	give	the	intervention	to	the	control	group,	although	they	better	understood	the	necessity	of	this	for	the	research	context—but	many	practical	problems	were	resolved.	In	many	cases	this	meant	that	the	trial	had	to	compromise	on	the	standardized	protocol,	and	the	researchers	had	to	find	solutions	to	legitimate	this	in	the	context	of	the	trial	methodology.		As	this	example	shows,	trials	are	not	standardized	evaluation	machines	for	the	uniform	application	of	interventions	in	practice,	but	need	flexibility	and	compromise	for	their	execution.	The	PreCare	trial	operates	as	a	reflexive	space	in	which	situated,	pragmatic	solutions	for	frictions	between	research	and	healthcare	practices	can	be	formulated	and	applied.	It	is	this	reflexive	space	that	makes	the	trial—and	by	extension,	EBM—possible	and	workable.		
Guidelines	and	dealing	with	uncertainty	Clinical	guidelines	have	emerged	as	a	response	to	reports	from	clinical	epidemiologists	in	the	United	States	in	the	1980s	that	that	were	huge	variations	in	medical	practice	and	healthcare	outcomes	between	medical	doctors	and	healthcare	organisations.	Guidelines	at	first	were	mainly	intended	to	support	medical	practitioners	in	making	decisions	in	diagnostics	and	treatment.	Over	time,	guidelines	have	developed	as	being	increasingly	based	on	evidence	from	RCTs	and	meta-analyses.	By	now,	a	guideline	industry	has	emerged	that	is	governed	itself	by	numerous	guidelines.	In	the	Netherlands,	the	method	of	
evidence-based	guideline	development	(‘evidence	based	richtlijn	ontwikkeling’	or	EBRO)	is	popular,	offering	many	methodological	handles,	for	example	on	the	weighting	of	studies	from	the	literature	in	which	systematic,	experimentally	gathered	evidence	is	preferred	over	other	types	of	studies.	The	newest	kid	on	the	block,	Grading	of	Assessment,	Development	and	Evaluation	(GRADE)	allows	for	more	leeway	and	among	others,	considers	the	relevance	of	the	evidence	found	in	the	literature	in	weighing	studies	to	be	taken	on	board	in	guidelines	(20).		
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Guidelines	have	met	similar	criticism	as	the	RCT,	in	that	they	promote	the	standardization	of	care	and	thus	surpass	the	complexity	of	individual	patients.	Moreover,	Guidelines	tend	to	become	ever	more	complete	and	as	a	result	give	less	guidance	to	practice.	In	most	countries	guidelines	have	been	taken	up	to	
control	medical	practice	by	third	parties	(governments,	payers)	and	have	thus	neglected	their	original	purpose	of	supporting	practical	decision	making.	Critics	have	also	pointed	out	that	patients	have	too	little	influence	on	the	development	of	guidelines	and	that	in	guideline	development	the	voice	of	healthcare	practitioners	is	bypassed	(21).		Here	again,	critics	(and	advocates)	have	largely	ignored	that	the	practice	of	developing	guidelines	differs	from	the	methodological	guides	such	as	EBRO	and	GRADE.	Sociologist	of	science	Tiago	Moreira	has	shown	for	example	that	in	the	development	of	guidelines	by	the	English	National	Institute	for	Health	and	Care	
Excellence	(NICE),	at	least	four	types	of	evaluation	are	used,	of	which	the	methodological	is	only	one	(22).	Additionally,	Guidelines	show	large	international	differences	in	which	differing	practices	of	dealing	with	uncertainty	or	conflicting	evidence	is	just	one	possible	explanation	(23).		To	gain	insight	in	the	practice	of	guideline	development,	we	researched	the	ways	in	which	guideline	developers	try	to	deal	with	uncertainty.	While	guidelines	were	originally	a	means	to	give	medical	practitioners	support	in	dealing	with	uncertainties,	guideline	developers	themselves	are	also	confronted	with	all	kinds	of	uncertainties,	for	example	because	of	a	lack	of	evidence.	From	interviews	with	guideline	developers	in	different	sectors	of	health	care	(e.g.	medical	specialist	care,	public	health,	general	practice),	it	appeared	that	guideline	developers	have	developed	all	kinds	of	mechanisms	to	deal	with	such	uncertainties	(24).	The	methodological	guidelines	surely	play	a	role	in	this,	but	intertwined	with	a	practice-based	strategy	in	which	the	knowledge	and	experience	of	medical	practitioners	is	used	for	guideline	development.	Guideline	development	for	infectious	diseases	proved	to	be	the	most	advanced	in	this	respect,	probably	driven	by	a	structural	lack	of	research	results	with	the	spread	of	new	infectious	diseases	combined	with	a	need	to	act	immediately.	Guideline	developers	in	this	area	had	developed	a	network	with	practitioners	from	Public	health	services	across	the	Netherlands	in	order	to	be	able	to	respond	to	new	developments	and	monitor	the	effects	of	the	proposed	guidelines.		Also,	with	the	development	of	clinical	guidelines	we	thus	see	a	much	more	reflexive	practice	that	could	have	been	expected	on	the	basis	of	the	guidelines	for	guideline	development	and	which	allows	the	gathering	and	use	of	all	kinds	of	knowledge,	next	to	that	produced	in	experimental	research.	Following	sociologists	May	and	Finch	we	could	speak	of	a	practice	of	reflexive	monitoring	(25),	allowing	for	and	stimulating	the	mediation	between	evidence	and	practice	and	stimulating	productive	practices	of	guideline	development;	that	is:	stimulating	the	development	of	guidelines	that	both	reflect	the	state	of	the	art	in	research	and	can	actually	be	used	in	practice.				
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Using	guidelines	in	healthcare	practice	Within	the	EBM	movement	that	have	long	been	concerns	about	the	use	of	clinical	guidelines	in	practice.	While	guidelines	were	meant	to	reduce	practice	variation	and	quickly	disseminate	the	results	of	experimental	research	into	healthcare	practices,	the	results	of	this	endeavour	seem	to	be	disappointing.	Practice	variation	has	in	fact	hardly	been	reduced	over	the	last	decades,	as	is	shown	by	the	unending	stream	of	publications	on	the	topic	(26),	and	the	take-up	of	guidelines	in	medical	practices	has	also	not	been	met	with	much	enthusiasm.	Research	on	the	implementation	of	guidelines	consistently	shows	that	guidelines	are	used	in	about	50%	of	cases	(27).		This	has	given	impetus	to	a	whole	range	of	flanking	policies	and	practices	that	should	stimulate	the	uptake	of	guidelines.	As	a	result,	guidelines	play	an	ever-increasing	role	in	regulation	and	procurement.	Also,	many	large	scale	quality	programs	have	been	set	up	to	‘roll	out’	guidelines—in	the	Netherlands,	these	include	programs	such	as	‘Better	Faster’	and	‘Care	for	Better’,	see	e.g.	(28,	29).	Also,	the	science	and	practice	of	implementation	has	been	further	developed	and	‘implementation’	in	healthcare	can	by	now	call	itself	an	academic	field	of	its	own,	including	its	own	journals	and	academic	associations	(30).		Research	on	the	use	of	guidelines	in	practice	however	often	uses	a	rather	problematic	perspective	on	use,	often	just	seen	as	the	‘correct’	application	of	a	guideline,	in	which	‘correct’	is	more	often	than	not	defined	by	the	researchers.	Questionnaires,	file	research	or	observations	are	then	used	to	‘measure’	the	percentage	of	patients	or	medical	actions	in	which	the	guideline	is	applied.	Again,	ethnographic	research	on	medical	practices	paints	a	different	picture,	in	which	the	use	of	guidelines	and	protocols	receives	new	meaning.	Care,	as	shown	in	this	type	of	research,	is	not	just	the	application	of	rules	from	guidelines,	but	much	more	a	messy	process	in	which	different	options	are	constantly	weighed	and	tested	given	the	often	complex	situation	in	which	patients	(and	professionals)	find	themselves	(31).		In	a	study	on	the	use	of	guidelines	on	heart	failure	by	cardiologists,	we	started	off	with	studying	the	patient	records	to	see	in	which	and	how	many	cases	the	guideline	was	actually	followed	(32).	Consistent	with	the	literature,	this	appeared	to	be	in	about	50%	of	cases.	In	a	next	step	we	interviewed	the	cardiologists—with	the	patient	records	in	hand—to	get	a	feel	for	their	experiences	in	using	the	guideline	and	find	out	why	they	did	(not)	use	the	guideline.	From	these	interviews	it	not	only	appeared	that	the	cardiologists	were	well	aware	of	the	existence	of	the	guideline	and	applied	it	in	their	practices,	but	also	that	often	they	had	good	reasons	not	to	‘apply’	the	guideline	with	specific	patients.	Often	this	entailed	the	sensitivity	of	a	patient	to	specific	drugs	or	the	fact	that	patients	suffered	from	multiple	conditions	which	made	the	direct	application	of	the	guideline	to	those	patients	impossible.	In	the	end,	for	only	10%	of	patients	it	remained	unclear	why	the	guideline	was	not	applied—a	completely	different	picture	than	often	found	in	the	literature	on	guideline	use.		Care	workers	appear	to	take	guidelines	much	more	into	account	than	often	assumed.	Guidelines	do	give	direction	to	their	actions.	This	however	does	not	
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mean	that	they	follow	guidelines	uncritically.	It	is	precisely	in	the	confrontation	between	the	guideline	and	the	patient	(and	possible	other	factors)	that	decisions	on	treatments	emerge.	Again,	this	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	the	use	of	evidence	is	a	reflexive	practice	in	which	guidelines	together	with	their	contexts	of	application	lead	to	specific	diagnostic	or	therapeutic	interventions.	Guidelines	are	an	essential	part	of	this,	but	instead	of	dictating	specific	actions	they	rather	offer	a	kind	of	‘reflexive	guidance’.	Like	we	saw	in	clinical	research	and	the	development	of	guidelines,	the	use	of	guidelines	in	healthcare	practice	can	rather	be	described	as	a	practice	of	mediation	between	the	guideline	and	the	specificities	of	the	context	of	application.		
Conclusions	I	started	this	essay	with	the	question	what	we	can	learn	from	evidence-based	medicine	for	evidence-based	policy.	Rather	than	basing	this	on	formalistic	prescriptions	of	EBM	often	found	in	the	literature,	I	took	a	practice-based	approach,	focussing	on	the	ways	in	which	EBM	is	‘done’	in	practice.	By	analysing	three	‘episodes’	in	the	practice	of	EBM	the	success	of	EBM	seemed	to	be	based	on	completely	different	mechanisms	than	often	assumed.	Three	such	mechanisms	seemed	crucial:	creating	reflexive	spaces	for	the	mediation	of	research	and	practice,	the	reflexive	weighting	of	evidence	in	the	light	of	practical	contexts,	and	the	use	of	evidence	as	a	form	of	reflexive	guidance.	What	do	these	conclusions	mean	for	the	practice	of	evidence-based	policy?	And,	what	are	the	prospects	that	these	conclusions—themselves	a	product	of	research—can	be	translated	to	policy	contexts?		Before	addressing	the	first	question,	let	me	start	with	a	cautionary	note.	When	translating	evidence	from	one	field	to	another	one	always	risks	not	taking	into	account	qualitative	differences	between	those	fields.	Some	authors	have	for	example	argued	that	EBP	is	in	nature	much	more	complex	than	EBM	as	it	has	to	deal	with	a	more	heterogeneous	context	and	builds	on	more	practical	epistemologies	(9,	33).	While	I	do	agree	that	context	matters	and	that	EBP	should	take	into	account	the	varying	complexity	of	the	problems	it	tries	to	tackle	(8),	I	hope	to	have	showed	in	this	essay	that	practices	of	EBM	are	complex	in	themselves	and	that	the	differences	between	EBM	and	EBP	in	this	regard	are	not	essential.	Learning	across	domains	moreover	needs	a	more	practice-based	approach	this	gives	a	deeper	understanding	of	why	a	specific	practice	is	successful	(or	not).		The	formalistic	translations	of	EBM	to	evidence-bases	policy	arrangements	that	I	cited	earlier	are	unproductive	precisely	for	the	reason	that	they	lack	such	a	practice-based	approach.	Too	large	a	separation	between	research	and	policy	for	example	is	not	desirable	as	it	prevents	the	necessary	reflexive	mediation	between	the	two—as	it	does	in	the	connection	between	science	and	practice	in	EBM.			The	analysis	of	EBM	as	presented	above	also	means	that	practices	of	reflexive	monitoring	should	be	taken	much	more	seriously	in	contexts	of	evidence-based	policy	and	should	lead	to	mutual	sense-making	and	modification	of	policies.	This	then	also	entails	that	policy	arrangements	should	indeed	leave	room	for	reflexive	monitoring	and	should	create	platforms	for	reflexivity.	Additionally,	one	may	conclude	that	research	cannot	be	productively	organized	outside	of	the	policy	
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process.	One	the	one	hand	it	should	take	into	account	the	dynamics	and	complexities	of	policies	and	use	the	insights	of	policy	practitioners	in	developing	research	designs,	while	on	the	other	hand	research	results	can	not	act	as	the	final	arbiters	of	policies	but	should	be	seen	as	just	one—albeit	an	important	one—ingredient	of	the	policy-making	process.		What	then	are	the	prospects	for	such	an	arrangement?	I	can	best	speak	here	for	the	Dutch	context	as	this	is	the	one	I	know	best.	Within	the	Netherlands,	the	prospects	are	both	good	and	bad.	Bad,	because	As	a	result	of	cuts	in	healthcare	and	in	health	(services)	research,	there	is	an	increasing	fix	on	‘quick	wins’	and	on	the	implementation	and	‘roll	out’	of	research	results,	without	much	attention	for	changing	contexts.	The	space	for	incremental	policies	with	forms	of	reflexive	guidance	therefore	is	limited.	Research	policy	is	moreover	increasingly	focused	on	‘valorisation’	of	research;	while	this	means	that	societal	relevance	of	research	is	pushed,	the	values	that	are	supposed	to	come	of	that	are	almost	exclusively	economic.	The	quality	systems	of	universities,	still	much	focussed	on	as	much	as	possible	papers	in	English	language	journals	(that	are	hardly	read	by	Dutch	policymakers	and	practitioners),	offers	little	room	for	the	interventionist	research	practices	that	are	necessary	to	develop	productive	relations	with	policy	practices.		Luckily	there	are	also	positive	developments.	The	last	years	have	seen	an	increasing	discussion	on	the	position	of	the	universities,	and	research	policies	in	general,	amongst	others	fuelled	by	the	Science	in	Transition	movement	(see	http://www.scienceintransition.nl/english,	accessed	8	July	2016).	The	Ministry	of	Education	started	an	initiative	to	come	to	a	national	research	agenda	that	seems	to	leave	room	for	more	practice-informed	input	(http://www.wetenschapsagenda.nl/?lang=en,	assessed	8	July	2016).	Interestingly,	also	the	failure	of	many	policy	initiatives	provides	room	for	reflection.	The	generally	felt	crisis	in	the	transparency	program	leads	to	new	initiatives	in	different	health	sectors	with	other	types	of	accounting	for	care—see	e.g.	the	work	of	the	association	for	long	term	care	organisations	on	‘narrative	accountability’	(34).	In	reimbursement	policies,	the	discussion	on	‘appropriate	care’	seems	to	open	up	space	to	discuss	the	relations	between	research	and	care	in	different	ways	than	usual	until	recently.	Many	policy	fields	show	movements	that	make	room	for	the	development	of	new	ways	to	organize	the	relation	between	research	and	policy.	New	organisational	arrangements	for	this	relation	have	been	developed,	such	as	the	‘Academic	collaborative	centres’	that	allow	for	new	relations	between	policymakers,	practitioners	and	researchers	(35).	The	ACCs	are	partnerships	between	research	organisations,	policy	departments	and	practitioners,	stimulating	the	interaction	across	organisational	and	epistemological	boundaries	and	as	such	furthering	both	policy-relevant	research	and	evidence-informed	policies.	Once	started	in	public	health,	these	collaborative	centres	have	now	spread	to	all	kinds	of	policy	fields,	such	as	youth	care,	supervision	and	reimbursement	policy.	Academic	collaboratives,	if	well	embedded,	offer	reflexive	spaces	for	the	mediation	of	policy,	practice	and	research.	Their	success—or	failure—is	however	dependent	on	the	extent	to	which	actors	from	these	different	worlds	do	indeed	receive	and	use	the	space	to	experiment.	
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